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ABSTRACT
Real estate markets are periodically plagued by excess supply, rent concessions and few
arms-length transactions. During such periods, valuation is problematic. The model presented
here requires the forecasts of future vacancy rates, and equilibrium and actual rental rates.
Vacancy rate forecasts of market participants are obtained, the equilibrium rental rate is specified
as the cost of capital, and a rental adjustment equation is estimated in which realeffective
Sydney office market rents are related to gaps between both natural and actual vacancy rates and
equilibriumandactual real effective rental rates.
Value estimates (relative to replacement cost) for 1992, including that for above-market
leases, are computed and the sensitivity to key assumptions is shown. Value/i'eplaccmentcost
calculations are then made for the entire 1985-92 period and contrasted with comparable
estimates implicit in data published by BOMA and LW, two prominent Australian real estate
sources. Lastly, the ratios of real effective rents to equilibrium rents and value to replacement
cost are projected for the 1993-2006 period.
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and flEERIn equilibrium,real estate will be valued at (approximately)
replacement cost.When value exceeds replacement cost in a market, new
construction surges, raising vacancies and lowering rents and thusvalue.
When replacement cost exceeds value, replacement construction is deferred,
lowering vacancies and raising rents and value. Moreover, expectations of the
construction, vacancy and rent responses imply that existing real estate
values will be only modestly sensitive to changes in required real after—tax
returns caused by real interest rate ortaxchanges.' Because hig1er long—
term real interest rates lower real estate values, construction declines and
rental income on existing properties rise. That is, the rental cash flows on
existing real estate are more analogous to those on a sluggishly adjusting
adjustable—rateloan than to the fixed coupons on a long—term bond; thus the
percentage real estate value decline would be far less than that of a long—
ternbond.
As a result of the construction response mechanism, deviations of real
estate values greater than five percent from replacement cost would be rare in
relatively stable markets, i.e., those without substantial excess supply or
demand.Unfortunately, stable well—functioning is not the way one would
describe office markets in many part of the western world. In London, Tokyo,
most national capitals of Scandinavia, most state capitals of Australia, and
many large U.S. cities, vacancy rates of 20 to 30 percent have been common,
real effective rents have plunged, and values are almost certainly far below
replacement cost. And in the transforming socialist economies of Central and
Eastern Europe, the profit—motivated construction equilibrating mechanism
described above has not existed for at least a half a century. For the value
Hendershott, Follain and Ling (1987) make this point in their analysis
of the impact of the 1986 tax act on real estate values. Ling (1992) extends
the argument in his analysis of the impact of capital gains tax rate changes.of any type real estate in any locale there to be near replacement cost would
be pure happenstance.
This paper illustrates a method for valuing real estate in overbuilt (or
underbuilt) markets with office buildingdatafrom Sydney, Australia.The
method is presented in Section 1, where fundamental value is expressed as
replacement cost less the present value of expected below—equilibrium real
rental income.Underpinnings for the calculation of below—equilibrium real
rentsare giveninSection II;equilibrium real rents arespecified and real
rental adjustment equations are estimated using data from the 1970—92 period.
The percentage change in real effective rents is related to gaps between both
the natural and actual vacancyrates and equilibrium andactual real rental
rates.Expectations of future equilibrium real rents (including real discount
rates) and vacancy rates thus provide a future rental income stream from which
the present value of expected below—equilibrium rental income, and thus
fundamentalvalue,can be computed.
The value/replacement—cost ratio is calculated forSydneyin Section
III, and its sensitivity to a number of assumptions tsindicated.Most
importantly, the 1992 ratio is not sensitive to real interest rate (and thus
risk premium)assumptionsowing to offsetting adjustments in below equilibrium
rents and the discount rate.Also, the value of above—market leases, which
likely existed on Sydney buildings leased up in the early l990s, is computed.
In the absence of price Thubbles," price should equalfundamentalvalue
plus the value of above—market leases.2 In Section IV,estimatesof the
2SeeFlood and Hodrick (1980), Shleifer and Summers (1990) and Stiglitz
(1990) for useful discussions of the literature on asset market bubbles.
Whilethe construction response will not guarentee the absence of bubbles, it
will clearly limit their duration.
2ratio of fundamental value plus above—market Leases to replacement cost are
compared and contrasted with ratios derived from series commonly reported in
two prominent Australian real estate sources, JLW and BOM&.3 During the
1990—92 period, the .JLW and BOMA series were SO to 100 percent greater than
fundamental value (plus the value of enforceable above—market leases). An
important issue is whether the reported series are misrepresentations of
market value or reflect a speculative bubble. While independent evidence on
Sydney land values is offered for the development of a speculative bubble in
the second half of the l9BOs, the same evidense implies the bubble burst in
the early l990s.Further, the surge in Sydney office market construction in
the late l9BOs, a reasonable builder response to a prices exceeding
fundamental almost guarentees the bursting of such a bubble in the
early 1990s.That is, the 1992 BOMA data (and the JIMdata toa lesser
extent) appear to overstate market value significantly.4
I.The Basic Valuation Model
The fundamental value of a property in period t (Vj is the present
value ofexpected future net operating income. Assuming, for simplicity, that
the expected ratio of operating expenses to replacement costs (exp) and one—
The Sydney Jones—Lang—Wootten (JLtJ) Research and Consultancy Office
reports effective rent, vancancy rate and capital value series for most
Australian capital cities. The Building and Operating Management Association
(BONA) reports cash flow and appreciation returns for different property types
in most capital series.The BOMA series are analogous to those produced by
the Frank Russell company in the U.S. (the appreciation return component is
based on appraisals, not transactions).
Some have argued that appraisers are reluctant to revalue properties
sharply over short periods. This tendencycouldbe exaggeratedfor downward
adjustments owing to incentives of investment managers to maintain the values
upon which their percentage fees are based.
:3period real risky financing rates (r) are constant through tiiae, value at time
t for a tax—exempt investor is
- (1)
Vt — (l+r)
where g is the expected real gross rental rate per replacement—cost dollar of
occupied space, v* and v are the 'natural" and expected vacancy rates (v*
being constant), and RC, the current replacement cost, is expected to decline
at the depreciation rate, di Real gross rents on all space are obtained by
adjustingthe rental rate on occupiedspace by the ratio of actual to natural
occupied space.
Inequilibrium, v3 will equal v*for all j, gross rents will equal
realfinancing costs, economic depreciation,and operating expenses, and value
willequal replacementcost. The equilibrium rental rate is thus defined as
=+ d+exp. C2)
Thevalidity of (1) can beverified by setting all vt+j —v*,allgt+j—
andsubstituting (2) into (1).
The determinants of the V/RC ratio are of particular interest to us. To
place these determinants in better focus, we add and subtract
Technically, the zero—coupon rate (plus an appropriate risk premium)
for each maturity should be used to discount each period's cash flow. When
the yield curve is steeply sloped and the cash flows are markedly uneven,
using different—period discount rates can greatly affect valuation.
Similarly, the expected inflation rate between the current period and when the
cash flow will be received should be used to compute each cash flow.
4f (r'-d)RC(1—d)i'=RC (1+r)i
from the right hand side of equation (1). Combining terms and dividing by RC,
we see that the V/RC ratio is reduced from unity to the extent that expected
ftjture below—equilibrium rents (BERT) exist:




Thekeys to valuation are first specifying equilibrium rents (the real
interest and depreciation rates and the expense ratio) and second determining
both how far the rental rate (g adjusted for vacancies) is currently below the
equilibrium rate and the time path along which the rental rate will return to
equilibrium. The latter involves projecting the time path of vacancy rates
and the real gross rental rate.We now turn to estimates of a real gross
rental adjustment equation.
II. Explanation of SydneyRealEffective Rents
A long tradition exists of relating the percentage change in real
effective rents to the difference between the "natural"and observedvacancy
rates (Eubank and Sirmans, 1979. Rosen andSmith,1983, andWheatonandtorto,
1988):
5Ig,_1 = A (v—v+_1). (5)
As popular as this relation is, it suffers from three problems. First, the
equation provides no relationship between the levels of actual andequilibrium
rents, which must be equal in equilibrium.Second, the adjustment equation
requires substantial overshooting of the natural rate in response to shocks
other than a change in the equilibrium rental rate.6Third, the equation
cannot hold simultaneously for leases of different terms.
Say that the market is initially in equilibrium with gross rents equal
to equilthrium rents, the vacancy rate equal to the natural rate, and value
equal to replacement cost. A negative demand or positive supply shock (excess
space unexpectedly becomes available) increases vacancies and decreases rents
(and thus values). The contraction in construction resulting from value
declines turns vacancies around, but rents continue to fall until the vacancy
rate is back to the natural rate.1 The market must then go through a reverse
adjustment with rents rising, first with falling vacancies and later with
rising vacancies, until they return to equilibrium, vacancies return to the
natural rate, and value again equals replacement cost.To create the force
returning rents to equilibrium, the rental adjustment equation necessarily
entails the vacancy rate substantially overshooting the natural rate.The
vacancy rate will decline below the natural rate because value is less than
replacement cost (net construction is negative) when the actual vacancy rate
Wheaton and Torte (1993) discuss the microfoundations of the adjustment
equation and estimate a less constrained form for numerous U.S. cities on data
from the 1979—91 period. They do not impose an equilibrium rent relationship.
If the disturbance was a decline in the real interest rate, then the
adjustment is complete at this point; rents have declined to the new lower
equtlibrjum level, and value equals replacement cost.
6first returns to the natural rate.
Moreover, even if the rental adjustment equation characterized one—
period leases, it cannot hold for longer term leases,With rational
expectations, the rent on multiperiod leases will be an average of expected
future one—period leases, just as longer term bond rates are averages of
future one—period bond rates.Thus expectations that one—period rents will
rise in the future will turn rents on multiperiod leases upward before the
vacancy rate reaches its natural level.8 Logically, equation (5) cannot hold
simultaneously for leases of different term.
To allow a more general adjustment path with pleasing long—run
properties, real effective rents are specified as adjusting to gaps between
both the natural and actual vacancy rates (v* and v_i) and equilibrium and
actual net rents (g* and g_1):
=A (v*—v,_1)+(g*4
— (6)
Withthis equation vacancy rates do not have to overshoot following a
supply shock. After high vacancy rates have dragged rents significantly below
equilibrium, the known eventual return to equilibrium acts as a force causing
real rents to rise, even when the vacancy rate is still above the natural
rate.
The Data
Rental adjustment equations are estimated using annual data from Sydney
In a cross—section study of individual leases, the term of the lease
can be entered as a regressor to capture the differential impact of future
expected values of one—termleases on thevalue oflonger—term leases with
differentterms. In a pooled time—series cross—section study, the impact of
term should be allowed tovaryovertime because the term structure of leases
varies over time.
7over the 1970—92 period.0 The natural vacancy rate is treated as a constant
over time.10In(5) or (6), Vtta_aisincludedas a regressor andthe
constanttern is Av*.Thus the natural rate can be computed after the
estimation as the ratio of the constant tern to the coefficient on the lagged
vacancy rate (A).
Real effective tents require the downward adjustment of real face rents
for both free rent periods and tenant improvements. Conveniently for us, JLW
(1992) has collected data on both of these terms for Sydney office markets
over the 1970—91 period. According to their data, rent incentives increased
sharply over the 1989—91 period, rising from less than four months equivalent
free months rent (including adjustment for improvements) on a ten—year lease
to almost 23 free months. JLW also compute effective real rents by
discounting/amortizing real cash flows with a real interest rate.We have
adjusted JLW's methodology in only one respect; they amortize the present
value of the rent incentives over the life of the building whereas the correct
amortization period is the length of the lease,With this adjustment, the
amortized value of the rent incentives jumped from 6 percent of real face rent
in 1989 to 61 percent in 1992.11 The percentage change in the resultant real
effective rent is the dependent variable in our analysis.
The equilibrium real gross rental rate equals the real risk—free rate
All data were generously supplied by the Sydney JLW Research and
Consultancy office.
10 Few degrees of freedom prevent serious testing of a nonconstant
natural vacancy rate. It is worth noting, though, that reported evidence
seeming to suggest large time variation in natural vacancy rates may simply
reflect continuing market disturbances (llendershott and Kane, 1992).
Their methodology understates the increase in value of rent incentives
and thus the decrease in effective rents between 1989 and 1992. Rather than a
48 percent real decline, they compute a 26 percent decline.
8plus a risk premium, the depreciation rate, and the expense ratio.An
approximate Australian risk—free real rate was computed as (l+rf)/(l+s)—1 for
semi—annual intervals over the December 1969 to June 1992 period, using the
ten—year Treasury rate as the risk—free rate and a three—period average of
annualized percentage changes in the Deflator for Private Final Consumption
Expenditures as the expected inflation proxy. The series actually employed is
a smoothed version of the calculated series because longer term real interest
rates should move relatively smoothly, The smoothed real risk—free rate drops
from 0.02 in 1970 to zero in early 1971, stays there until the middle of 1974,
and then abruptly plunges to —0.04 and remains there though the middle of
1977.The series then rises linearly to 0.06 in June 1982, where it stays
through June 1992.
The risk premium and depreciation rates are set at 0.035 and 0.025,
respectively, throughout the period.BOMA data indicate that the ratio of
outgoings (operating expenses) to gross rates has ranged from 0.285 to 0.335;
exp is set equal to 0.05, giving a gross rental rate of 0.17 and an outgoings
ratio of 0.294 (0.05/0.17). Thus the equilibrium rental rate declines from
0.13 in 1970 to 0.07 in the 1975—77 period, and rises to 0.17 throughout the
1982—92 span. To convert this gross rental rate series to a current (1992)
dollar rent per square meter number, the series is multiplied by the ratio of
the JIM—based real effective rent level to the equilibrium rental rate in a
year in which equilibrium and actual rents were equal. Given the steadiness
of both actual and equilibrium rents during the 1983—85 period, real effective
rents are assumed to have equalled equilibrium rents in June 1986. This
equilibrium rent series and the JIM real effective rent series are plotted in
Figure 1.A clear relationship is evident, with the JIM series generally
9lagging the equilibrium series.
The last key input is the vacancy rate. This series began and ended the
l970s at about3percent. with a sharp increase and reversal in between (the
peak was 13 percent at the end of 1976). Real effective rents followedthe
vacancy rate with about a two year lag.The vacancy rate stayed below S
percent throughout the l9BOs and was 3 percent in the middle of 1989; during
the second half of the decade, real effective rents rose by 50 percent. Since
then a plethora of completions and negative absorption has driven vacancy to
23 percent and halved real effective rents.
The Estimates
Table 1 reports some estimates of the rental adjustment equation.
Coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses), the equation 1(2
(not adjusted for degrees of freedom), and the implied natural vacancy rate
are reported. The first estimate is of the naive model in which rents adjust
solely to the difference between the natural and actual vacancy rates. As is
seen, the equation explains less than a third of the variance.The implied
natural vacancy rate is 6.0 percent.
Adding the equilibrium rent gap more than doubles the explanatory power.
While the explanatory power is reasonable, the equation misses a significant
portion of the broad swings in real effective rents.Mote specifically.
between 1978 and 1989 (Junes) real rents rose by $513, $375 of which was lost
by June 1992. The equation explains only 72 and 38 percent, respectively, of
the increase and reversal.
To better explain the sharp fall in real rents during the June 1989—June
1992 period, the forward change in the vacancy rate (the December to December
10change explainingthe June to Junechangein rents) has been added. Knowing
thatsubstantialcapacity was coming on line should have directly reduced real
effective rents. While adding the forward vacancy—rate change does not
increase the explanatory power much (the t—ratio on the variable is barely
above one), the equation is far better able to explain the pre1989 rise in
real rents and especially the subsequent decline. Rather than the 72 and 38
percents just mentioned, 83 of the increase and 63percent of thedecrease are
explained.Theestimateof the natural vacancy rate rises slightly to 6.8
percent.
Figure 2 plots the level of real effective rents and the level predicted
dynamically(the initial level moved forward based on the predicted changes).
Because the annual errors in predicted changes using the difference equation
arelargely independent, the predicted level tracks the actual level
reasonably well. Figure 2 also includes forecasted rent levels for the 1993—
2003 period, assuming the Sydney vacancy rate is 23 percent through December
1994 and then declines (see below). The equation predicts another $120 (27
percent) decline in real effective rents before an upturn in 1998.12
III. Value/Replacement—Cost Ratio! in .June 1992
In this section, the modelisfully parameterized, andV/RCratios are
computed for Sydney in June 1992 under the base assumptions using each of the
real rental adjustmentequations.The sensitivity of the V/RC ratio
calculated using the "traditionalTM difference rental—adjustment equation to: a
moreoptimistic vacancy rate decline, alterations in estimated rental—
12Accordingto recent JLWdata, real effective rents declined by 30
percent between June 1992 and June 1993.
11adjustment coefficients, and a decrease in real interest rates is illustrated.
Lastly, the value of long—lived enforceable leases, which would result in
slower declines in real rents after 1989, is also computed.
Model parameterizatton
The V/RC ratio is unity less the present value of below—equilibrium
future cash flows divided by replacement cost. As can be seen from equations
(2) and (4), the variables to be specified are: the real risky discount rate
(r), the depreciation rate (d), the expense ratio (exp), the natural vacancy
rate (v*) and the time paths of future vacancy an4 gross rental rates.
Moreover, from equation (6), the time path of future gross rental rates is
fully specified by the other variables, With constant future values of r, d,
v' and exp, only a future tine path ef vacancy rates is needed for the
calculations.
Most of the June 1992 values have already been specified: r —0.095,d —
0.025,and exp —0.05,giving a gross equilibrium rental rate of 0.17. From
the estimation, v* —0.068.With the assumption of equality between actual
and equilibrium rents in June 1986, the actual gross rental rate in June 1992
is 0.117.
The last key assumption is the future time path of vacancy rates
expected by market participants. Table 2 lists assumed future vacancy rates
in Sydney as of year—end over the 1985—92 period.Each column contains the
rate expected during June of the year heading the column to exist at the end
of the years in the far left column (the diagonal contains observed vacancy
rates). The "expectations" for 1989—92 were developed in discussions with JLW
staff (JLW was itself forecasting higher vacancy rates in 1989 and 1990).
12Huge construction in process indicated a 7 percentage point rise in the
Sydney vacancy rate between endl99l and end1992. The expected rate is assumed
to remain in the 23 percent range throughout 1993—94, then to decline by two
percentage points a year through 1998, at which point the decline accelerates
to 2.5 points per year owing to the recognition that some stock will be
profitably converted to other uses. By 2003, the rate is S percent.13 After
that it stays below the natural vacancy rate until actual real rents return to
their equilibrium level in 2006.
1992 V/RC Calculations
With the above described set of assumptions, the June 1992 V/RC ratio
for office buildings in Sydney Australia is 0.43S. Figure 3 shows the time
paths by which the ratios of net cash flows to equilibrium net rents and value
to replacement cost, respectively, are expected to return to unity. Net cash
flows in 1992 were just under half of equilibrium net rents, and they plunge
to under one—fifth throughout the 1994—96 span. During the same period, real
effective gross rents are decline by 27 percent. Real gross rents then turn
around gradually before jumping as a 9 to 13 percent annual rate during the
1999—2003 period. This rise, combined with the increase in occupancy, pushes
net cash flows up rapidly.In contrast, the rise in the V/RC ratio is a
virtual constant 10 percent per year over the 1994—99 period before dampening
as the ratio dovetails into unity. Value rises immediately, in spite of the
60 percent further decline in real net cash flows, because the period of
13 The slight overshooting in vacancy rates after 2002 is needed to get
rents to stabilize at their equilibrium level.
" A comparable calculation of this ratio for U.S. office markets
nationwide in early 1992 was 0.6 (Hendershott and Kane, 1992). A calculation
for Melbourne Australia, using the Sydney rental adjustment equation, is 0.36,
owing to a sharper rise in vacancy rates and decline in real rents.
13higher rents is coming closer.
Of course, our assumptions are just that, so calculations are presented
to indicate the sensitivity of the result to variations in the assumptions.
First, we assume a more optimistic vacancy rate pattern: the rate declines by
a point in 1993 and 2.5 points per year. reaching 7 percent in 1999 (and then
overshootingthrough2003).Not only is space occupied sooner, but rents
adjust toward the equilibrium quicker. The result is a VJRC ratio of 0.565.
On the other hand, a rental adjustment equation in which the response to the
rent gap varies with the ratio of natural to actual vacancy rates fits the
1970—91 data about as well as the equation with a constant rent gap response
implies a lower value,With this equation, rents initially decline further
and then rise back to equilibrium less rapidly. As a result, the estimated
V/RC ratio drops from 0.435 to 0.21.
The ratio is not sensitive to the assumed real interest rate when
feedback effects are incorporated. To illustrate, consider the impact of a
decline in the real rate of interest from its unusually high June 1992 level.
While the decline reduces below—equilibrium rents directly by lowering the
equiLibrium level, and thus raises the V/RC ratio, the time path along which
actual rents rise to the lower equilibrium level is lower (the initial drop in
rents is steeper), owing to the reduced value of the equilibrium—actual rent
gap, and the present value of a given below—equilibrium rental shortfall is
greater. When the 1992 ratio is recomputed for a two percentage point lower
real rate, V/RC rises only from 0.435 to 0.45.
The reported V/lW ratios computed so far are for buildings earning
market rents. However, in the l980s Australia had lease contracts in which
rents on existing buildings would rise with increases in market rents but not
14decline with decreases. To the extent that tenant rents have not •ratcheted"
down in response to declines in market rents, the rougtly 50 percent decline
in real effective market rents observed between 1989 and 1992 was largely
avoided. Because of their above—market leases, these buildings are worth more
than their fundamental values.
To calculate how much more buildings with above—market teases should be
worth, real rents are adjusted upward. We consider buildings fully leased—up
withtenants who obtained 10—year leases throughout the l980s. Thus, one—
tenth of the building "goes to market" each year over the next decade.
Nominal rents on the nonmarket leases are constant (real rents fall by 5
percent per year).By June 1999, all leases are at market.Under these
assumptions,the replacement—cost ratio in 1992 for prime buildings, including
both fundamental value and the premium for above—market leases, is 0.558.
That is, fully enforceable above—market leases were worth another 0.12 of
replacement cost.
IV. Fundamental, BOMA, and JLW Values, 1985—92
Using our framework and appropriate assumptions, a time series of the
value/replacement—costratio for Sydney office buildings isconstructed for
the1985—92period. In addition, comparable "marker ratios are computed from
theBOMA and JLW data. Comparison of these ratios with that estimated using
our method reveals substantial differences.
The real interest rate, depreciation rate, and expenseratio are set at
The 10—year lease term is consistent with the computation of effective
rents and has been the typical term for the Sydney office market. Just as the
premium on bonds paying above—market coupons will be greater the longer the
maturity of the bond, the value of above—market leases will be greater the
longer the term of the lease.
15the 1992 values throughout the 1985—92 period.The Mrketn vacancy rate
forecasts were listed in Table 2. For the June 1985 though June 1988 period,
theyear—end and nextyear vacancy rates areassumed to be accurately
forecast;thevacancyrateis then increased a percentage point a year to 8
percent and then reduced over two years to the natural rate. For 1989—91, a
sharp increase in the vacancy rate (based on discussions with JLW) is followed
by a reversal, including a brief time below the natural rate.
Column 1 of Table 3 contains the calculated Sydney V/RC ratios for the
L985—92 period. The ratio is roughly constant at 1.0 over the 1985—89 period
(the 1989 ratio is no higher than the 1985 ratio, in spite of the SO percent
greater real effective rent level in 1989, because of the substantially higher
vacancyrates —andthus real rent declines —forecastedin 1989 than in
1985).Subsequent sharp jumps in vacancy rates and plunging real effective
rents lower the ratio to 0.435 in 1992.The 1992 premium for the value of
above—market leases is also listed in the table.
Two sources publish "market" data from which V/RC ratios can be computed
andcompared with the fundamental value ratio adjusted for above—market
leases.A comparable ZOMA/Russel].series comes from a two—step procedure.
First, the appreciation component of the BOMA/Russell office return series is
cuniulated to generate a nominal appraised value series.Second, to obtain a
real constant—quality measure, this series is divided by the deflator for
private consumption (scaled to unity in June 1985) and then blown up by 1.25
percent per year to allow for depreciation in the replacement—cost
denominator. (The 1.25 percent is less than the general 2.5 percent
depreciation rate because new buildings are continuously added to the BOMA
data base.)The BOMA/Russell series is set equal to 1.01, the fundamental
16value/RC ratio, in June 1985, which is consistent with our assumption that
tents equalled their equilibrium values in 1986.These values are shown in
column 2 of Table 3.For the JLW calculation, we begin with their nominal
capital value indicator and adjust it as in step two, using a 2.5 percent
depreciation factor. The resultant V/ItO estimates, including the assumed 1.01
1985value,are listed in column 3.
TheBOMAandJIM data increase sharply between June 1985 andJune1989,
53 and 68 percent respectively, and then decline abruptly between June 1989
and June 1992, 34 percent(BOMA)and5? percent (JLW).The smaller BOMA
movementsare consistent with appraised values lagging market values.16 Both
series, but especially that based on BOMA data, are substantially above
fundamental value in June 1992.
Two possible explanations exist for the surge in the BOIIA and JL%J series
in the second half of the l980s.First, the real required return on real
estate (the risk premium in our model) may have declined. Second, a
speculative bubble (increase of market relative to fundamental value) may have
formed.One indicator of a speculative bubble, given the constancy of the
fundamentalvalue series, would be an independent estimate of a sharp increase
in real land prices.17 Such an estimate exists.The Valuer—General of New
South Wales computed a 350 percent real increase in land value per square
meterof office space in the Sydney central financial district between 1986
Like the Russell—NCREIF data in the U.S., the BOMA—Russell data in
Australia are largely based on appraised values.The JLW data are JLW's
estimates of market values.
In our valuation model, land is valued together with the structure;
the rents that the two can earn jointly determines the value of the total
property.
17and 1989.18Ii land were only 5 percent of the total value of offices
constructed in 1986, the real land increase would account for virtually all of
the computed increases in the BOMA and JLW ratios.
Because land values may be misiaeasured in the RC measure, we compute the
ratiosof the BOMA/Russell and JLW based ratios to our fundamental value
(adjusted for leases) ratio, thereby eliminating measurement error in 1W.
Ratios of ratios, assuming 0.03, 0.06,and0.09 in 1990—92, respectively, to
be the ratio of enforceable above—market leases to replacement cost, are
reportedin columns 4 and 5.As can be seen, JLW's 1992 ratio is almost 50
percent greater than our estimate of fundamental value plus the value of
above—market leases, and the ratio derived from BOMA's 1992 data is almost
double our estimate.19
These multiples suggest that the late l980s office market bubble has not
yet burst. However, data from the New South Wales Valuer—General suggest that
bubble has popped; real office market land prices have returned to their 1986
values.Moreover, any decline in the real estate risk premium during the
1985—89 period has almost certainly also been reversed.The implication is
that market value should be in line with fundamental value (plus above—market
leases). We conclude that the JLW, and especially BOMA, Sydney office market
Land value data are contained invarious reports; the latest are in
Valuer.Ceneral (1992, Table 18, p 21). These data pertain to the middle of
the year and are supposed to represent market values based on the comparable
sales method. The Valuer-Ceneral's estimates, which are the basis for
property tax assessments, may be challenged legally.
10TheJLW overestimate can be largely explained by their mismeasurement
of the decline in effective real rents during the 1989—92 period.
18data overstated market value significantly in June 1992.20
V. Summary
Real estate markets are periodically plagued by excess supply, rent
concessions and few arias—length transactions. During such periods, valuation
is problematic. The model presented here expresses fundamental value as the
difference between replacement cost and the present value of expected below—
equilibrium rents. Equilibrium rents are specified and real rental adjustment
equations are estimated using Sydney office market data during the 1970—92
period.The percentage change in real effective office rents is related to
gaps between both the natural and actual vacancy rates and equilibrium and
actualreal rental rates.Inclusion of the rent gap guarentees that actual
rentswilleventually return to their equilibrium level (and more than doubles
the equation's explanatory power). With this relationship, only market
participants' forecast of vacancy rates until the market returns to
equilibrium is needed to estimate value.Such a forecast was obtained from
theSydney JUl consulting office.
The estthated fundamental—value/replacement—cost ratio for the Sydney
office market was about 1.0throughoutthe midl9B5—midl989 period.The
subsequentsurge in vacancies from 3 to 23 percent halved effective rents and
lowered the ratio to 0.43 by mid1992. For prime prel989 properties with
enforceable "rachet" clauses, real rents have only begun their plunge. The
above—marketrents these buildings are earning could beworth another 0.12 of
replacementcost.
20TheJUl difference for Melbourne is comparable;the BOMA ratio isover
threetimes greater than our estimate of fundamental value plus the value of
above—market leases.
19Ratios developed from the capital return component of the BOMA return
series and from the JLW capital value series indicate about a 50 percent
increase in the ratio in the second half of the 1980s.Even with a sharp
decline since then, these ratios imply values 50 to 100 percent greater than
our estimate of fundamental value plus enforceable above—market leases. While
evidence on Sydney land values and of an office market construction boom
supports the conjecture. of a speculative bubble forming in the second half of
the1980s, the same evidence implies that the bubble has burst and that the
BOMA data especially significantly overstate market value.
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22Table 1: Explanation of the Percentage Change in Real
Effective Sydney Office MarketRents,1971—92
equ. constant vac_1 Mac 1(2t
1.1 .1125 —.0189 .317 6.0
(.0062)
1.2 .1121 —.0176 2.57 .650 6.4
(.0047) (0.60)
1.3 .1159 —.0171 2.26 —.0085 .679 6.8
(.0046) (0.64) (.0069)
The dataarefrom JLW. Vacancy rates are in percentage points; rental rates
are in decimals. Standard errors are in parentheses. See the text for exact
definition of the variables.
23Table 2: Vacancy Assumptions Used in 1985—92 Calculations
19851986 1987 1988198919901991 1992
1985 2.6
1986 1.6 1.6
1987 2 1.2 1.2
1988 3 2 2.3 2.3
19.?9 4 3 3 3.9 3.9
1990 5 4 4 5 8 9.4
1991 6 5 5 6 10 13 15.7
1992 7 6 6 7 10 15 19 23
1993 8 7 7 8 8 13 20.5 24
1994 7 8 8 7 6 10 17 23
1995 6.8 7 7 6.8 6 7.5 13 21.
1996 6.8 6.8 6.8 S 10 19
1997 5.5 7.5 17
1998 5.5 5.5 15








Data are those expected in June of the years on the horizontal to exist at the
end of the years on the vertical.
24Table 3: v,ac Ratios for Sydney. 1985—92
(1) (2) (3) (4) (S)
[(2)/Cl)) [(3)1(1)]
RelativeRelative
June V/lW BOMA JUl BOMA JLW
1985 1.01 1.01 1.01 1 1
1986 1.02 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.02
1987 1.02 1.13 1.14 1.11 1.12
1988 1.01 1.32 1.46 1.31 1.44
1989 0.98 1.54 1.69 1.57 1.72
1990 0.86 1.53 1.61 1.72 1.80
1991 0.68 1.25 1.17 1.69 1.58




25FIGURE 1: Actual and Equilibrium Rents
—0-- egulllbdum rent
ice
0 I I I
70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91FIGURE 2:







•us, ,,,, II ••1 u•uuu•hhhum
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 9(3 95 97 99 01 03 05
year
—s- actual-s--predictedFIGURE 3:











0.1 I I I I I I I I
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
year
actuSCF/equ.CFV/RC I